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Abstract
Individuals' free choices in vaccination do not guarantee social optimum since individuals' decision
is based on imperfect information, and vaccination decision involves positive externality. Public
policy of compulsory vaccination or subsidised vaccination aims to increase aggregate private
demand closer to social optimum. However, there is controversy over the effectiveness of public
intervention compared to the free choice outcome in vaccination, and this article provides a brief
d i s c u s s i o n  o n  t h i s  i s s u e .  I t  c a n  b e  s u m m a r i s e d  that individuals' incentives to vaccination and
accordingly their behavioural responses can greatly influence public policy's pursuit to control
disease transmission, and compulsory (or subsidised) vaccination policy without incorporating such
behavioural responses will not be able to achieve the best social outcome.
Immunisation represents a classic case of social dilemma:
a conflict of interest between the private gains of individ-
uals and the collective gains of a society. An individual's
self-interest and choice often leads to a vaccination uptake
rate less than the social optimum as individuals do not
take into account the benefit to others [1]. Conventional
wisdom generally favours public intervention in order to
produce a socially warranted level of vaccination. This line
of argument is primarily based on the externality associ-
ated with individual decisions, since individuals are pre-
sumed to make choices on the basis of their own welfare
gains, without considering the full social impact of their
decisions. As the benefits to society are larger than the
sum of those to individuals, public policy measures aim
to increase demand closer to the social optimum by sub-
sidising the vaccine (many countries provide vaccines free
of charge) or through compulsory vaccination, although
such a policy is almost always partial. Individuals with
religious, medical or social reasons are often exempted.
There is, however, controversy over the effectiveness of
public intervention compared to the free choice outcome
[1-3], and it is the intention of this article to address this
issue.
Vaccination decisions are made under imperfect informa-
tion, which means an individual's assessment of the risks
and benefits of vaccination is often inaccurate. But even if
individuals had perfect information regarding the cost
and benefits of vaccination, the free choice outcome
would still be different from the social outcome due to the
'free rider' problem associated with vaccination. The
changes in risk of infection tend to induce changes in
activities that put the individual at risk, which in turn alter
the dynamics of disease transmission. There is a feedback
mechanism between infection rate and rational response,
but the classic models of infectious disease have not incor-
porated such endogenous behavioural responses into
their analyses. Researchers in the emerging field of 'eco-
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nomic epidemiology' depart from existing epidemiologi-
cal studies by modelling aggregate behaviour on the
premise that a rational individual's decision, with respect
to vaccinations, is influenced by both economic and epi-
demiological incentives. Geoffard and Philipson [2,4],
and Francis [3], following this perspective, argue that a
higher rate of disease will trigger increased preventive
actions (i.e., vaccination) and thus suggest that the likeli-
hood of infection and disease incidence will eventually
fall with rising prevalence, and vice versa when prevalence
is low. This type of analysis along with other research [1]
essentially challenges the effectiveness of public interven-
tion of any kind that is aimed to stimulate demand, due
to the fact that private incentives to vaccinate counteract
the expected outcome of such interventions. Price subsidy
does not achieve the expected outcome because preva-
lence of disease (which is related to risk of disease) coun-
teracts the price sensitiveness of demand. Mandatory
vaccination policy does not ensure the social optimum
either. Private decisions to vaccinate outside the public
program remain an important component of the total
demand for vaccination. Partial mandatory programs
crowd out the private demand for vaccination outside the
program, in the sense that some individuals would vacci-
nate in the absence of the program, but will not vaccinate
in its presence (as prevalence is lowered by the compul-
sory program and therefore the incentive diminishes).
This crowding out effect is one of the possible interpreta-
tions of why pre-school vaccination rates are relatively
low in the US, given the mandatory vaccination required
in public schools [5]. The crowding out effect can also be
observed in the time delay of vaccination where vaccina-
tion of certain cohorts of children is delayed when the
prevalence of disease is lowered by vaccination of earlier
age groups of children. It needs to be mentioned here that
the analysis of Geoffard and Philipson [2], on which the
above arguments are based, has cast doubt on public
intervention in vaccination due to its inability to achieve
eradication. In reality, the purpose of government inter-
vention is to improve welfare by lowering endemic preva-
lence rather than achieve eradication, since eradication
may be too expensive relative to its benefits [6]. But the
argument that private incentive counteracts the objectives
of government intervention still holds when the objective
is to lower endemic prevalence.
The transmission and control of infectious diseases are
strongly influenced by both the individual and collective
choices people make. The choice of vaccination is guided
by the incentives and constraints regarding vaccination,
and individual free choices do not converge to the social
optimum for a variety of other reasons such as imperfect
information and differences in the rate of time preference
between individuals and society [6,7]. If individual
behaviour does not match with the social optimum, soci-
ety as a whole faces the costs of morbidity and mortality
associated with the spread of infectious diseases. This begs
the question: what are the feasible options available to
society to ensure the social optimum? On the one hand,
the outcome of individual free choice does not guarantee
the social optimum. On the other, subsidised and/or
compulsory vaccination do not achieve the social opti-
mum because the effect of such policy is counteracted by
individual behavioural response. Nonetheless, public
interventions in vaccination are justified on the grounds
that public policy suggestion is based on actual risks as
compared to perhaps wrongly perceived risks under indi-
viduals' free choice, and public policy aims to maximize
collective welfare. But the effect of such policy would be
smaller than what is desired because of the counteracting
effect of behavioural responses on the expected outcome
of interventions. Behavioural responses have great influ-
ence on public policy's pursuit to control disease trans-
mission, and policy suggestion without incorporating
such behavioural responses will not produce the best
social outcome. Given this backdrop, the ideal solution
would be to coordinate public policies by designing strat-
egies which are best able to motivate individual free
choice towards a social optimum. Policy intervention
should therefore be based on a better understanding of
people's choices and be complemented by providing bet-
ter information and education to a concerned population
rather than attempting to overcome this social dilemma
solely through authoritarian interventions.
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